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Abstract 
This paper defines media platforms in terms of the 
theory of traditional two-sided media markets, then 
goes on to develop the theory to include content 
providers as a third side of the market (the 
“platformisation of media”), the widespread 
introduction of sellable meta-information about the 
platform network (the “mediatisation of platforms”), 
and the importance of social networking technologies 
to the media platform. Issues of concern raised by this 
include privacy, intellectual property, and equity.   
Genres of resistance to unwanted visibility and 
invisibility, such as spoofing, spamming, fingering and 
silencing are also noted.  
 
1. Background  
 
It is increasing difficult to distinguish any actual 
analytical category that separates “retailers” such as 
Amazon eBay and Apple from “search engines” like 
Google or Bing or “social media” such as Facebook 
and Twitter or even networked services such as Uber 
or AirBnB. Nearly all of these companies include 
features for searching content; for saving profiles; for 
recommending, rating, and commenting on content; for 
contributing content; for marking other profiles or 
content as favoured; and for locating and grouping 
audiences and targeting them with content.  Obviously 
the scale, scope, and emphasis of these features is in 
each case is different, but it is not a stretch to argue 
that they all represent instances of a similar 
phenomenon.  They are, by and large, distributors who 
do not create content but who acquire and redistribute 
it, and who sell access to and information about the 
people who read, write, play, buy and connect using 
their services, while at the same time attracting those 
people by giving them tools to find their way in a sea 
of content, products, and people. 
Work has been done on the political economy of 
new media [1] and on some genres within it [2-6]. 
Nevertheless, chief among the changes to the wider 
Web in the last decade has been the rise of social 
technologies and the increasing prominence of the 
“platform” as the new model of media which crosses 
categories between different businesses like Facebook 
and Google and media forms as different as radio and 
video gaming.  In tandem with studies on platform 
economics and the meaning of platforms has come a 
renewed interest in algorithms and software studies as 
a way to approach modern digital content 
infrastructures. This paper analyses the structure of 
online media platforms in order to answer the 
following questions: 
 
• What can an economic view of platforms 
contribute to our understanding of platform 
media? And, conversely, how does an analysis of 
platform media contribute to our general 
understanding of other platform businesses? 
 
It could be argued that instead of platform media 
the term algorithmic media [7-9] might be used.  
However, although an empirical focus on algorithms is 
warranted, it is not (or not entirely) the presence of 
digitized logic that gives these markets their character.  
Platforms existed prior to digitized algorithms – good 
examples are credit cards and newspapers.  Yet, 
algorithms make the functions of the platform much 
more efficient and available.  A secondary question 
that this paper will seek to answer, therefore, is which 
algorithms are central to platform media. 
As platforms develop and algorithms increase in 
both power and complexity, what is at stake is 
meaningful public oversight over these developments 
and their implications for society.  Concerns about 
privacy, content ownership, and cultural diversity are 
often handled on a case-by-case basis, but the analysis 
in this paper seems to show systemic features that need 
to be carefully examined by academics and regulators.  
First I outline what I mean by a media platform.  I 
then describe media platforms from both a technical 
and an economic perspective, using the concept of a 
multi-sided market in order to understand the relations 
between different interest groups.  I focus on the 
centrality of social networking technologies as 
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2 
essential means of control of the platform and its 
dimensions, and discuss the centrality of surveillance 
and of algorithms of measurement, ranking, and sorting 
for platform businesses.  I illustrate these mechanisms 
with examples from current media. 
 
2. Platform Economics and Media 
Platforms  
 
As literature on multi-sided and two-sided markets 
has developed within the field of economics, often 
using media businesses as examples, media scholars 
have also been attempting to grapple with what the 
“platformisation” of media might mean for issues of 
content diversity, privacy, freedom of expression, and 
the relation between free and paid labour.  Mansell 
argues strongly that new empirical evidence is needed 
because “[t]he structural features of ‘platformised’ 
markets are continuously changing in ways that are not 
captured in the assumptions in economists’ theoretical 
models” [10]. 
The “platform” is an increasingly common type of 
online organizational form.  Online platforms include 
search engines like Google, retailers like Amazon and 
eBay, content providers like Wikipedia, and social 
networks like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, as well as 
some parts of more traditional software and hardware 
manufacturers like Microsoft (Bing) and Apple (iTunes 
and App Store).  Online platforms are central to what 
might be called the content or media infrastructure of 
the Web – that is to say, the infrastructure through 
which digital content and media, both privately and 
industrially created, are distributed throughout the 
Web.  Companies based on the platform model, such as 
Google and Facebook, rather than the giant content-
creating companies (such as TimeWarner or Disney), 
have emerged as the distinctive new media industrial 
form of the digital era. 
The word platform is ambiguous and multimodal. 
Gillespie [11] highlights the discursive aspects and 
rhetorical functions of the platform, citing its 
computational, architectural, figurative and political 
meanings.  Implicit in all these definitions is the 
platform as a “raised level surface,” which is “designed 
to facilitate some activity that will subsequently take 
place,” [11].  The definition of platform, according to 
Gillespie, implies a place in which all are equal, visible 
and assisted in fulfilling their aims.  As Gillespie 
describes, platform-based companies use this definition 
strategically to deflect criticism and to elide differences 
between different constituencies. 
One aspect not taken up by Gillespie is the 
increasing use of the word platform within the 
economics literature.  As with the other meanings of 
platform, within economics the platform is a central 
area in which exchanges are coordinated and in which 
the presence of the platform gives additional benefits 
the parties in the exchange  [12].  A market with such a 
platform is also called a two-sided or sometimes multi-
sided market (or sometimes, multi-sided business or 
multi-sided platform) [13].  
In these type of markets, the platform creates value 
by bringing disparate groups together (for example, 
readers and advertisers) and allowing them to interact 
in such a way that both parties are better off 
(advertising messages reach readers, and readers better 
understand the world and are entertained). Rochet and 
Tirole (who won the Nobel prize in 2014 for his work 
on understanding and regulating these markets) give 
several media examples to illustrate their definition of 
two-sided markets in their key 2003 paper: video 
games (with consumers and software developers as the 
two sides), streaming media (consumers and servers), 
browsers (users and web servers), portals (“eyeballs” 
(quotation marks in the original paper) and 
advertisers), newspapers (readers and advertisers) and 
TV networks (viewers and advertisers) [12].  
According to Rochet and Tirole, the platform sets 
the price structure and price level, and a key strategic 
or competitive goal is to ensure that both sides of the 
market sign up to the platform.  In order to ensure this, 
the platform may – and often does – structure prices so 
that one side of the market operates at a loss while the 
other side generates all the profit of the platform.  To 
take an example from modern newspapers, the profit of 
a free newspaper (like Metro or The Evening Standard 
in the UK) is what it charges its advertisers, less what 
it costs to “pay” its readers in news and entertainment. 
In a free newspaper the readers are entirely subsidized 
by the advertisers, and one side subsidizing another 
side is a common structure for two-sided markets. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Two-sided (traditional) media market 
(newspaper example). 
 
Why do advertisers subsidise readers? In fact, they 
only do so in publications whose readership is includes  
enough of the advertiser’s customers to make it worth 
their while. In a multi-sided market, demand for the 
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platform (and relatedly, the price it can charge) is, in 
large part, determined by how many participants are 
present on each side of the market.  The more readers 
of the right type, the more attractive the paper is to 
advertisers.  In economic language, when the benefit of 
a network expands with its size, it is called a network 
effect.  When the benefits of the network size reach 
non-participants in the network – so the size of the 
readership benefits another group, the advertisers, it is 
an indirect network effect.  In traditional media 
markets, generally it is only the advertiser side that 
increases demand due to indirect network effects [13].   
Platforms exercise power in this example through 
setting prices on both sides –in the example of Metro, a 
price of zero to readers – which serves to attract and 
retain enough customers on one side (the reader side) 
for network effects to kick in and attract the other side 
(the advertisers).   
Multi-sided markets with platforms exist in many 
businesses.  For example, the literature contains 
references to credit and debit cards [12-14], 
manufacturing [15], and services like real estate [12].  
Yet, very many examples in the literature relate to 
classic media markets such as newspapers and 
television, newer media such as video games and 
streaming media, and internet media such as search and 
social media, and other types of computer software and 
operating systems.  In other words, media markets 
have been seen as platforms or multi-sided businesses 
since economists began to develop theories about these 
markets. 
   
2.1 The Platformisation of Media Businesses 
 
If traditional media types such as newspapers, 
radio, and television are already included in the 
definition of a multi-sided or platform market, what 
then might it mean for media to be “platformised,” as 
Mansell [10] suggests?  There are (at least) three 
dynamics at play in this platformisation process.   
The first dynamic is the continuing separation of 
media content from media distribution methods (in the 
1990s this was referred to as convergence) so that 
content provision becomes a third side of the market.  
In our previous example from Rochet & Tirole’s 
original descriptions, “newspapers” were the platform 
and “readers” and “advertisers” were the sides of the 
market.  Today’s media markets are perhaps better 
understood if we instead took the analogy that paper 
was the platform and the news organization or 
freelance writers contributed news content.  It’s easy to 
see this structure with Google, which has advertisers 
and searchers looking for content provided by web site 
developers, or with iTunes, where listeners find content 
provided by record labels and individual artists. The 
abstraction of content from delivery method is central 
to the platformisation of the media (see also Manovich, 
who discusses this separation as a key property of 
media software [16]).  The addition of content 
providers as a third side of the market in turn implies 
that indirect network effects in terms of strengthening 
demand from consumers, and therefore advertisers, 
will apply to platforms that supply a great amount or 
variety of content (as suggested by the success of 
content aggregators such as NetFlix, iTunes and 
Google).   
 
 
 
Figure 2. Three-sided new media market 
(search engine example). 
 
The separation of content from distribution is not a 
new trend in media, (one can think, for example, of the 
ever-increasing trend for freelance journalists within 
the field of journalism), but the development of 
computerized content management systems has 
enabled this separation in such a way that it represents 
a qualitative and not just a quantitative shift in media 
business. 
 
2.2 The Mediatisation of Platform Businesses 
 
The second dynamic might perhaps be termed the 
mediatisation of the platform.  This is the development 
of meta-information about the platform as a key part of 
the platform business, for re-sale (for example, to 
advertisers) as an add-on or additional product.  In this 
way, non-media platform companies begin to resemble 
media.  For existing media businesses, the collection of 
information about their users, content providers, and, 
to a lesser extent, advertisers, is extended in the 
“mediatized” model. 
An example of a platform business which is in the 
process of mediatisation is Uber, a platform-based taxi 
business with passengers and drivers as the two sides 
of the market.  It collects and analyses information 
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about its network of passengers and drivers and their 
behavior, and has begun to use this information in its 
business, sometimes for PR purposes and sometimes 
for revenue [17].  In the diagram below, the platform 
graphic is changed to a cylinder form, which 
conventionally denotes a database, to indicate the 
presence of this meta-information. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Multi-sided media market with 
mediatised platform. 
 
Once again, the focus on amassing information 
about users is not a new trend within media (consider  
the importance of Nielsen audience metrics within 
television), or even within business in general, where 
“relationship management” theories are built on 
customer databases, but within modern platforms these 
trends are made much more prominent and intense 
using digital technologies.   
 
2.2 Social Networking Technologies and 
Platform Media 
 
Evident in practice, but not much mentioned by in 
the literature on platform economics is the frequent 
introduction of social networking technologies to one 
or more sides of the market.  Social networking  
technologies contribute to the development of the size 
of the platform, the separation of content from 
distribution, and the amassing of information all at the 
same time. 
By social networking technologies I mean 
technologies which allow users firstly to create and 
manage an identity and community, that is, to set up a 
profile and to find, view, link to, and traverse other 
profiles; and, secondly, to create and manage content: 
to post and edit content, link to content, share content 
with others, and rate or rank content.   This definition 
partly follows Ellison & boyd [18; 19] and its 
development by Kane et al [20], but with more weight 
given to content-related features since content is a key 
side of any media market, and the relationship between 
content and profile is deep and complex. 
Although they are commonly used on the 
“consumer” side of media markets, social technologies 
may be incorporated, in addition, into the content 
provider or developer sides of the market. It is also 
possible to incorporate these tools into the advertiser 
side as well, though this is much less common.  
In social network-enabled platforms, a different 
network effect, called a direct network effect, is 
created: the number of users on the platform directly 
benefits the user, since the more people are connected, 
the more they can interact with their friends. This 
direct network effect stimulates demand on the 
consumer side in addition to the indirect network 
effects on advertising and content demand.  Thus, 
social technologies can increase market share 
(consumers would like to be on the network where 
most of their friends are) or stabilize a side of the 
market that might otherwise be vulnerable to 
competitive pressures (consumers will tend not to leave 
that network if their friends do not also leave). There 
are some vulnerabilities, of course, for example the 
generational effect that leads young people to seek 
different media from their elders. 
 
 
Figure 4. Mediatised platform with a social 
network enabled among users. 
 
Social technologies serve other functions, as well, 
for the mediatised platform business in creating the 
meta-information about the platform, and in 
strengthening demand from both users and advertisers. 
On the profile side, they describe (and to some sense, 
create) the network topologically through “friend” 
links and structured profile information.  On the 
content side, they incorporate at least part of the third 
side of the platformised media market (content 
provision) by generating content themselves. On 
Instagram, for example, users provide the photographic 
content which other users browse; on Etsy, business 
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owners provide discussions and tips for other business 
owners. In addition, these technologies provide 
information about quality of content on the platform 
(through rating and ranking functions such as likes on 
Facebook or ratings on TripAdvisor or 
recommendations on Amazon) and the structure of the 
content (eg through playlists on YouTube or links 
between patterns and yarns on the knitting network 
Ravelry). The use of social technologies in media 
platforms is compelling for many reasons, although 
their implementation and configuration varies. 
 
 
3. Platforms and algorithms 
 
It is evident that the mediatised and social-network-
enabled platform that is the modern media business 
must have a considerable technical infrastructure. Not 
only must physical datacenters store and transmit the 
content and information produced by the different sides 
of the market, but complex computer algorithms must 
manage and process that data.  The centrality of 
algorithms to modern media businesses (and other 
mediatised platform businesses, as in the earlier Uber 
example), has been noted in the literature in the past 
few years, prompting discussion of an “algorithmic 
turn” in media studies, and potentially of “algorithmic 
media” as the new paradigm [11; 21-24]. There have 
been discussions of algorithmic cultures [25] and 
algorithmic epistemologies.  
Gillespie calls for an investigation of “public 
relevance algorithms”.  Napoli suggests, rightly, that 
algorithms are probably best viewed as sociotechnical 
assemblages with a distinctly institutional character. 
This paper aims to contribute to the discussion, not by 
suggesting how to investigate algorithms, but by 
outlining which types of algorithms deserve the focus 
of media scholars, based on the previous discussion of 
the economic features of platform businesses. 
 
4. Types of media platform algorithms 
 
The core economic function of the platform is to 
facilitate exchanges between the different sides of the 
market, as we have seen.  In the media market, the 
central tripartite “exchange” has generally been the 
delivery of content to the user and at the same time 
user attention to the content provider and the advertiser 
[26].  
The algorithms related to this exchange are one part 
of the algorithmic ecosystem of a media platform. In 
this context, algorithmic ecosystem simply refers to a 
complex and interdependent set of algorithms.  This is 
not to say that these algorithms are unchanging or 
independent from human intervention. On the contrary, 
human intervention, institutions, and practices are key 
to the continuing function of these algorithms [8; 27].  
However, the algorithms provide a useful focus for 
examining, evaluating and comparing media platform 
businesses. 
The delivery of media content to the user can be 
handled by a browsing interface (for example, a 
channel or electronic program guide), a searching 
interface (the query box), or a simple display interface 
(featured programming).  Most media platforms 
provide all three types of delivery. Users of the 
network generally experience these information reveals 
as guidance or navigational help.  
Algorithms for finding and displaying content 
therefore include simple functions such as listing, but 
usually the list is classified or sorted, and, most often, 
ranked.  We might think here of Google’s search 
engine results, but another interesting example of this 
is Snapchat, which has a time-limited display 
mechanism. Increasingly content may be visualized 
(this is, presented in a non-traditional format, such as a 
map or chart or other information graphic), and it can 
also be personalized; that is, the part of the network 
that is revealed to you could be quite different than that 
revealed to your neighbor (for example, your feed on 
Facebook is different to anyone else’s).  
As discussed above, mediatised platforms also, 
importantly, store and process information about the 
network itself, and these are the algorithms that 
constitute the second part of the algorithmic 
ecosystem.   Specifically they store and process 
information about users, about content, and about the 
relationships between users and content.  (Rarely, if 
ever, do they reveal to outsiders information about 
advertisers or relations between advertisers and users 
or advertisers and content.)  This requires algorithms 
that trace and track user behavior.  Initially these 
operated on page visits and clicks, traces of which 
were built into the very first Web servers in the form of 
http:// requests and referral records.  But increasingly 
high value information comes in the form of links of 
different types, both user-to-user (eg “follow” links on 
Twitter) and content-to-content (e.g., hyperlinks, the 
first-exploited source of network information).  Some 
links come with information about the type of link. For 
example, on Flickr you may identify “friends” but also 
“family.”  User-to-content relationships are established 
not just by page visits and clicks on a mediatised 
platform, but also by user-evaluation mechanisms such 
as likes, tags, recommendations, ratings and rankings.  
Similarities in these user-to-content relationships are 
then often used to identify implicit user-to-user 
relationships or content-to-content relationships as the 
topology of the network is more and more described.   
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The meta-information collected by the mediatised 
platform is then made available for searching and 
display to the advertiser or other market participant. 
These two classes of algorithms – search and 
display, and tracking and tracing – are linked by a third 
set which matches, groups, and sorts content and 
people dynamically. 
 
5. Platform media algorithms and politics 
 
While the use of social networking technologies 
and mediatised platforms makes economic sense in 
many cases, the implications of these platforms are 
troubling.  At least three key areas of public concern 
have been identified called into question with this new 
economic structure.  The first is privacy; the second is 
intellectual property; and the third is equity or fairness 
in representation.  When viewed a certain way, each of 
these issues of concern is about control of information 
– how much should be shared, and with whom, and in 
what way? These issues are central to the politics of 
media platforms because access to information and 
content on the network and about the network is the 
heart of the platform media business.  
Clearly algorithms do not exist in a social and 
political void, and in fact struggles for the management 
of the network away from its algorithmic base are 
common. Without access directly to the algorithms of 
revelation, network members turn to different tactics to 
protect or promote themselves and others, materially 
affecting, in some cases, the operation of the platform.   
Not everyone wants themselves or their actions to 
be made visible.  Criminals, for example, do not want 
to reveal their crimes; but neither do adulterers want to 
show their relationships, nor employees their off-hours 
hobbies. Companies and institutions don’t want their 
internal discussions known.  Dissenters may not wish 
to showcase unpopular political views. The right to 
privacy of both persons and corporate persons is 
enshrined in the UN laws. Unwanted visibility may be 
combatted by a variety of techniques (other than 
simply refusing to use the media platform): cloaking, 
or hiding your information; spoofing, or pretending to 
be someone you are not. 
Conversely, some would like to be more visible 
than the algorithms of revelation show them.  This 
category could include aspiring celebrities; ideologues 
who believe their views should be more widely spread; 
or companies with something to sell; or content 
providers in the margins who want to move into the 
mainstream. Unwanted invisibility may be combatted 
by spamming, or giving false information; or 
boostering, paying other network members for their 
links, recommendations, ratings, tags, comments and 
similar. 
Making other network members or network content 
more visible may also be desirable to some.  One may 
wish to indicate disagreement with the views or actions 
of network members and fingering people or content 
with tags (for example disagreeing their posts or 
posting a private exchange to a public space.)  One 
may wish to have better access to content by 
downloading it for use outside of the network. 
Strategies for excluding or blocking unwanted 
network members or content are also found. from 
certain discussions, etc. 
. 
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper I have laid out the economic 
discussion about multi-sided platform markets, and 
considered their implications for media platforms as 
we know them today.  I have argued that media is 
becoming more “platformised” as more sides are 
introduced to the market, notably in the form of the 
abstraction of content production from content 
distribution.  And, I have argued that platforms of 
different types have become more “mediatised” as they 
increasingly store a layer of meta-information about 
users and content for resale primarily to advertisers. 
Finally, I have argued for the importance of social 
networking technologies to the economic performance 
of media platforms.  Competitive logics within the 
media platform sphere focus heavily on ensuring a 
critical mass of users that will attract advertisers, which 
in turn means either securing attractive (and ideally 
exclusive content), either from traditional content 
providers or alternative from content generated within 
a social network.  Secondly, the focus is on building up 
information about that network of users (and content 
providers, potentially) to sell on to others, primarily 
advertisers. 
The central algorithms of the platform media 
ecosystem are firstly algorithms of search and display 
and secondly algorithms of tracking and tracing.  A 
third, meta-class of algorithms of matching and sorting 
links these first two classes.  While these algorithms 
may be opaque and complex as a group, each smaller 
element of the class is potentially more available for 
study by social scientists. 
The platform business creates revenue by 
controlling access to content stored within the platform 
and information about the platform.  Social issues of 
privacy, intellectual property, and equity are all 
directly and immediately implicated in the 
algorithmically-made decisions about who can and 
who cannot have access to the platform’s information 
and media content. Users, advertisers, and content 
providers all have adopted strategies to increase and 
decrease their own and other’s visibility and 
invisibility within platform frameworks, and these 
1817
 
 
7 
issues will continue to be at the centre of platform 
media design, management, regulation and governance 
in the future. 
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